UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

by

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This study analyzes the factors which were considered by United States decision makers in determining not to actively support the Hungarian revolutionaries during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

Following World War II Hungary became a satellite of the Soviet Union. In October 1956, a revolution by the people of Hungary against Soviet domination erupted. The revolution was forceably suppressed by the Soviet Union.

President of the United States, Eisenhower, was inexperienced in public office, leaned toward conservatism, and was heavily dependent upon his Secretary of State, Dulles, for foreign policy decisions. Dulles ran the State Department with a firm hand and was strongly opposed to communism.

United States foreign policy, as expressed by the Eisenhower Administration, was "liberation", the "new-look" and "brinkmanship". Their actual foreign policy toward Eastern Europe was containment of Soviet influence east of the boundaries which were established after World War II.

Certain factors encouraged active U.S. assistance to Hungary while other factors discouraged it. During the revolution Hungary withdrew from the Warsaw Pact and Premier Nagy requested protection by the great powers through the United Nations. Hungary held a significant geographic position for both the West and for the USSR from a military and a political point of view. Some claim that revolutionaries were encouraged by Western Radio Broadcasts to aggressively oppose Soviet domination and that these broadcasts led the Hungarians to believe that United States military forces would support an uprising. Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal prior to the action in Hungary. This created a distraction from Hungary when France and England landed troops in Egypt during the revolu-

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Hungary was a test of the de-Stalinization program of the Soviet Union which contributed to Russia's willingness to fight for Hungary's retention in the Warsaw Pact. The United States' impending presidential election influenced the Administration in it's final decision on Hungary. The United States military establishment was not geared to move into Hungary in an assistance role. Hungary's geographic location, without direct access from Western Europe, discouraged the use of Western military intervention in Hungary. United States emergency plans to assist the revolutionaries were not in being and no innovative plans were seriously considered for implementation. Secretary Dulles was hospitalized while the uprising was in progress, contributing to the apparent lethargy of the United States. United States public opinion did not appear to favor United States military involvement in Hungary.

In conclusion, this study determines that: United States foreign policy did not advocate active participation in the Hungarian crisis. A Warsaw Pact Hungary was more important to the Soviet Union than a neutral or pro-Western Hungary was to the United States. The risk of major war was too great for the United States to support the revolutionaries with military force. United States response to the situation was limited to public denunciation of Russian actions and to an attempt to curb hostilities through the United Nations. This author offers little criticism of the stand taken by the United States since the risks were too great and the prize was too small.

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INTRODUCTION

Following World War II Hungary became a satellite country of the Soviet Union along with other communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe. In October 1956, a revolution by the people of Hungary against Soviet control caused the Soviet Union to use military action against Hungarian civilians. This revolution placed the political leaders of the United States in a position whereby they were required to decide whether or not to assist the peoples of Hungary in their fight to free themselves from Soviet control.

This study will critically analyze all the factors which were considered by United States decision makers in order to reach the decision not to actively support the Hungarian revolutionaries against Soviet military force. The decision making body will be constructed, their personalities described, their values determined, and their foreign policy analyzed. The external pressures and the domestic situation which affected the Hungarian problem will be closely examined. Finally a conclusion will be drawn concerning the adequacy of the final decision and the resulting United States' actions.

CHAPTER 1

SITUATION IN HUNGARY

Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, following World War II, was two-fold--to provide machinery and to provide security for the Soviet Union.[1] The acquisition of machinery was accomplished in several ways. Some machinery from Eastern Europe was physically moved to the USSR. In other cases the Soviets used the machinery which operated in Eastern Europe to produce goods for use or for consumption within Russia. Along with machinery, the Soviet Union used the natural resources from mines in Eastern Europe for its own benefit.

The security which Eastern Europe provided Russia was achieved through a five phased plan. The overall objective of the plan was to achieve security through tight political control over the Satellite States. Phase One was associated with the military liberation of Eastern Europe by the Red Army. Driving out the Nazis, in most countries, gained popularity for the Soviets in the view of most East Europeans. But the Red Army brought with it local communists who would take part in the new political life of the liberated country. Many of these local communists had fled their homeland when the Nazis invaded. The Red Army insured that these communists were placed in political office when the new governments were formed.

During Phase Two, coalition governments were formed in each country. The coalitions consisted of all the main parties, except for those considered pro-Nazi parties.

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[1]J. Hampden Jackson, The World in the Postwar Decade (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1956) pp. 69-81.

However, in the long run, the governments were not genuine coalitions, because local communists were directed to infiltrate into as many political parties as possible.

Phase Three was designed to eliminate all people from political power who were not local communists. Various methods were used in the resulting purges. However, the results were effective in each case--local communists gained complete control. Phase Four, as applied in few instances, consisted of the elimination of local communists and their replacement by Soviet communists, either Russians, or local leaders who had been trained in the Soviet Union. And the Fifth Phase was to break the peasantry and the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe.

Turning now to the execution of this policy in Hungary, the internal situation in Hungary which led to the 1956 uprising will be presented. In April 1945, the Soviet Army drove the remaining German forces from Hungary. With the resulting fall of the Horthy regime, an entire political and social system disappeared in Hungary. It was necessary to create a new society and new institutions. However, in the resulting chaos Hungary appeared to be lacking in its ability to produce new leadership. The Communist Party, which had been illegal in Hungary, was brought to the forefront by the Soviets. The Party's leaders, many of whom had previously fled the country, were returned by the Soviet Army and given solid support. Initially the Party demonstrated a high sense of political realism. Not only did the Party include in its program the old aspirations of the nation, but it also called forth the former opposition parties to form a coalition. In November 1945, general elections were held. The Smallholders Party had an absolute majority of the votes (57%), while the Social Democrats and Communists each had 17%, and the National Peasants 7%.

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But the majority party was not allowed to form a homogeneous government. The Soviet Commander, Marshal Voroshilov, had only given his consent to an election based on free competition between the parties on condition that all agreed to maintain the coalition. Also, the Smallholders were obliged to give the key post of Minister of Interior to a Communist, first to Imre Nagy, and soon afterwards to Laszio Rajk.

The first revolutionary structural change was the liquidation of the large estate system. The large estates were divided among landless peasants. Later, large industrial enterprises were nationalized.

> The period between 1945 and 1948 was the most exciting in the history of the renascent country. It was not only a period of economic reconstruction, but also one of social, and to a certain extent spiritual, regeneration. The postwar inflation in Hungary, unparalleled even on a world scale, was stemmed, giving rise to hopes for economic prosperity. The accelerated process of nationalization signified a new change in the social structure. Time cast doubt on the justification of full nationalization, its usefulness being made questionable by the bankruptcy to which it eventually led; in that given period, however, it indicated the beginning of the liberation of new social forces.
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> True, the popular base of the new society broadened, and the chances for its democratic, or even socialist development increased; but, simultaneously, a withering of democratic institutions began. The form was made increasingly ornamental, while the content became more and more shadowy. There became a conscious process of divorcing the power from the people. The Communist Party forced its coalition partners--its democratic allies--to serve its own aspirations for power by means of persuasion, bribery or, most frequently, intimidation, thus depriving them of the possibility of becoming spokesmen for the country's progressive political aspirations.[1]

By 1949, with the heightening of East-West tensions, Stalin apparently recognized that the resulting general war, or possibility of general war, could begin a movement in the satellite countries that could lead to secession from

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[1]George Heltai, "Revolution and Society: A Case Study," SCOPE, Spring-Autumn, 1967, p. 12.

Soviet domination. He therefore set out to liquidate all Communist leaders in the Eastern European parties who might represent the interests of their own people, rather than Soviet policies--if given the opportunity.

The subsequent trials resulted in death for many and thousands were imprisoned. But they also drove the Hungarian Party farther away from the people and at the same time drew the Party closer to the Soviet Communist Party. Hungarian society became oppressed. The Hungarian people began to wish for a true socialist order. They equated socialism with freedom.

For some time after Stalin's death in 1953, there was little change in Moscow's relations with the satellites, despite the measure of relaxation in Soviet internal affairs. Conformity of the satellites to the Moscow line remained the major policy. However, since an evolution was taking place within the Soviet Union, in its methods of government, in the police system and in economic policy, it was expected that similar changes would occur in the satellites.[1] These policy changes consisted of giving more autonomy to the state in the relations between the state and the Communist Party; less police and political repression; and a slowing down of the growth of heavy industry by giving more attention to consumer goods, the standard of living and to agriculture.

In Hungary, these changes brought about "collective leadership" in the form of dividing leadership at the top with Rakoszi as First Secretary of the Central Committee and Imre Nagy's selection as Premier. Nagy was "recommended" for the office by Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev. Soviet amnesty, announced three weeks after Stalin's death, was followed by amnesty in Hungary in July 1953. Many Hungarians who had been arrested during the purges of the preceding

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[1]David J. Dallin, Soviet Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), pp. 167-189.

years were released from prison. Families who had been deported from Budapest in 1951 were allowed to return.

In August 1953, Moscow announced their new economic course for the slow-down of heavy industry in favor of food and consumer goods. By September, all of the satellites were well on the new road. In Hungary, criticism of the new economic policies resulted 15 months later when the Communist Secretary of Budapest reported that Hungarian economic leaders had shown themselves incapable of organizing the switch over.[1]

Imre Nagy was Premier of Hungary from 1953 to 1955. He fought for the loosening of controls by the state over the rights of individuals. He attempted to unite the theory of socialism to the actual practice of communism in Hungary. He was a popular figure among the Hungarian people, and he was recognized as a symbol of liberalism. Because of his liberal views, he was expelled from the Communist Party following his Premiership.

In early 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev initiated his "de-Stalinization" program. This relaxation of police rule among satellite states caused repercussions in Poland, and later in Hungary. It can be said that a normal human reaction took place. When an individual has lived under an extremely tight and strict disciplinary system for a long time, and then only some of these restrictions are lifted, the individual has a tendency to relax, and feels a desire to seek even more freedom than has actually been granted to him.[2] These demands in Poland were settled in a peaceful manner, and the Polish people did gain more freedom.

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[1]Ibid.

[2]United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York; Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 5-6.

As a result of initial repercussions in Hungary however, Rakoszi was replaced by Erno Gero in July 1956. The protests of the Hungarian people continued even after the replacement of Rakoszi. These protests were led primarily by writers and students. Some changes were made as a result of the protests. On 22 October 1956 Hungarian students held a meeting where they listed demands to be presented to the government.

> These demands contained most of the points put forward during the uprising itself. They included the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, the reconstruction of the government under Imre Nagy, --free elections, freedom of expression, the reestablishment of political parties, and sweeping changes in the conditions of both workers and peasants.[1]

On 23 October a mass demonstration was held in front of the parliament building in Budapest where the demands which had been adopted were voiced. Approximately 300,000 people demonstrated, and there was no violence to speak of. That same evening a large number of the demonstrators gathered in front of the radio building in Budapest in an attempt to have their demands broadcast. The radio building was guarded by the unpopular AVH (Secret Police) troops. A delegation from the crowd was sent into the building to present the demands. The delegation never returned. The demonstrators were ordered to disperse and they refused. Later, tear gas bombs were dropped onto the crowd from windows in the radio building, and AVH troops fired weapons into the crowd, killing some of the demonstrators. Hungarian Army units were called to the scene, but when they arrived some joined the demonstrators against the AVH and the remainder refused to act against the crowd. Soviet armor units arrived in Budapest at 2:00 A.M. on 24 October and joined the side of the AVH against the citizens of Budapest. Freedom fighters armed themselves as best they could. Many received

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[1]Ibid.

weapons from Hungarian soldiers. The Hungarian Army, as such, was somewhat dissolved during this period. Freedom fighters barricaded themselves in military barracks and factories where they successfully defended against the Russian tanks. Some sought protection in buildings in the city. Other fighters attacked tanks in the streets of Budapest with home-made fire bombs. The fighting continued until 30 October.

Before noon on 24 October, Radio Budapest announced that Imre Nagy had been appointed 'Chairman of the Council of Ministers.' On the same day, Gero was replaced by Janos Kadar. On 27 October, Premier Nagy formed a government consisting of ministers who were both communist and non-communist.

During Nagy's first premiership, he had adopted the New Course political view which called for relaxing restraints on the satellite countries. But during the period of his expulsion from the Party, Nagy formulated a new philosophy. He went beyond the liberalization of tight controls to a national communism belief.

> . . . by January 1956 Nagy was transformed from a communist whose practical perspectives were essentially domestic and on a broad issue subordinated to general Soviet requirements, into a national communist willing to put the purpose of Hungarian communism above the imperatives of Soviet policy.[1]

As a result, the appointment of Nagy was the beginning of an experiment in national communism in Hungary, similar to the situation which already existed in Yugoslavia.

On 28 October, Nagy ordered a cease fire on both sides, and by 30 October all fighting had ceased. On 29 October Nagy dissolved the AVH, a move

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[1]Z. K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 217.

which made him even more popular with the people. On 30 October Nagy announced that the one party system had been abolished, and on the same day Soviet troops began to withdraw from Budapest.

At this time it appeared that the situation would settle down, and Nagy indicated that negotiations with the Soviet Union would soon enable the complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. On 1 November, however, new Soviet troops crossed into Hungary and Nagy informed the Russian Ambassador that if the new troops were not immediately withdrawn, Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. Soviet troops continued to cross into Hungary, therefore at 5:00 P.M., the Soviet Ambassador was informed that Hungary had withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, and that the country had been declared neutral. Nagy then made a request to the General Assembly of the United Nations for assistance in defending Hungary's neutrality.[1]

Nagy continued to negotiate with the Soviet Union until 3 November for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the early morning of 3 November, heavy Soviet armor units moved into Budapest with the mission of overthrowing the Nagy Government. In the meantime Kadar had withdrawn from Nagy's camp and had formed a new Soviet backed government. The freedom fighters were annihilated by the overwhelming odds, and the Kadar Government replaced that of Nagy. By 10 November all fighting had ceased.

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[1]Ibid., p. 220.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES DECISION-MAKING BODY

The decision-making process of the United States, in deciding how the United States would react to the Hungarian situation, will now be studied. The decision-making body will be considered, outlining who the decision-makers were, and describing their relationship to one another. Finally their values and policies pertaining to the Hungarian situation will be presented.

Personalities

The President of the United States at the time was Dwight D. Eisenhower. His Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles. These two men constituted the pinnacle of the American foreign policy making body.

Eisenhower had been a successful military commander in World War II. He had been the Allied Commander for the invasion of France and was an extremely popular figure among the American people following the war. He retired from the Army in 1948 and went to Columbia University as its president until 1950. Even while at Columbia his national popularity was such that he received thousands of letters urging him to enter politics and run for President of the United States. He was recalled to active duty to serve as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Europe from 1950-1952. In 1952 he was nominated for President of the United States by the Republican Party and subsequently won the election.

Eisenhower had no experience in the political field but had vast experience in the highest positions of military leadership. He has been widely described as a man who could utilize his subordinates to the utmost of their abilities. In the political sense one could say that he was much more dependent

upon the advice of subordinates than while in the military because of his lack of political experience. Thus, Gunther says that: "He has a marked capacity to delegate authority, and he lets his subordinates make the most of their own decisions." He further said:

> Eisenhower is extremely deft at handling a group, almost any kind of group. His talent for conciliation, for welding a team, is one of his salient characteristics. When he is a member of a group not devoted strictly to military matters (as at Columbia) he is sometimes apt to give his opinions--at considerable length--too early in the discussion; he is overeager, and occasionally naive. An almost innocent impatience leads him to talk too much. But later, as he sees other points of view developed, he is commendably quick to modify his own. There is nothing static or cramped about Eisenhower. His attitude is always supple and aware. He is open-minded and likes to take advice.[1]

He was considered a man who worked with speed and precision. He was able to concentrate deeply on the problem at hand, and once the decision was made, he could divorce himself completely from that problem and move on to something else. Another notable characteristic was his optimism. He always moved forward looking for a positive solution to problems, and when blocked, he proceeded forward from a new direction. During the war he never considered defeat when planning military operations, regardless of how hopeless the situation seemed to be.

Organization and staff work were the keys to his method of operation. Prior to assuming high command in the Army he was best known for his own efficient staff work. He demanded that his presidential aides thoroughly investigate problems prior to submitting them to him for a decision. Normally the aides were required to present their information to the President in person and recommended

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[1]John Gunther, Eisenhower (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 16.

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solutions were to be included with these presentations. If fact-sheets were to be included, the President normally required that they be condensed to one written page for ease of reading and to insure that extraneous information was eliminated.[1]

His basic beliefs leaned toward the conservative line of thinking. Prior to accepting the presidential nomination he issued statements against federal "paternalism." He believed that the federal government should have limited responsibilities in its influence over the various aspects of men's day to day lives. He believed that a man's earning capacity should dictate his social and economic well being and that the federal government had no responsibility for augmenting that economic standard. On the other hand he was opposed to isolationism as an American policy as characterized by the United States position following World War I. He believed that America should maintain a position of strength in the world and exert its leadership in the world councils.

He considered himself neither a liberal nor a conservative. Eisenhower described his own political philosophy as one dedicated to responsible progress, whereby decisions should be made based upon what was good for America as a whole.[2]

John Foster Dulles appeared to have been preparing for the office of Secretary of State for his entire adult life. Both his grandfather and his uncle had been Secretaries of State. His diplomatic career started when at the age of 19, he acted as his grandfather's secretary at the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907. In 1918 he was Counsel to the American Commission to

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[1]Marlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (New York; MacMillan Co., 1956), pp. 8-9.

[2]Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York; Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 8-9.

Negotiate Peace. He was a member of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference of 1945 and to the United Nations General Assembly in 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1950. In 1950-1951 he negotiated the peace treaty with Japan. In short, he was as well qualified for the position as any Secretary of State had ever been.

President Eisenhower so trusted Dulles and admired his ability as Secretary of State that according to contemporary observers he gave Dulles essentially a free hand to conduct United States foreign policy as he saw fit. In 1957 President Eisenhower wrote a personel letter to Dulles saying, "Your accomplishments will establish you as one of the greatest of our Secretaries of State."[1] It appears that Eisenhower almost always followed Dulles' advice in foreign policy matters.

On the other hand, Dulles never used his privileged position with the President to attempt to exert his authority beyond constitutional limitations. All of his foreign policy actions were cleared through the President. Eisenhower was never surprised by a Dulles move because the President had been thoroughly briefed ahead of time by his Secretary of State and the President had approved the action. The working relationship between these two men appears to have been smooth, coordinated, close and mutually trustful.[2]

When Dulles spoke on foreign affairs, he spoke for the President of the United States, hence he was never lightly challenged. This relationship made it impossible for other executive departments to bypass the Secretary of State while it allowed Dulles to bypass other executive departments and get Presidential approval for what he had decided.

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[1]Hans J. Morgenthau, Truth and Power (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 101.

[2]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblinz, Duel at the Brink (New York; Doubleday and Co., 1960), pp. 20-22.

Within the State Department, Dulles had total control of the operation. He operated the Department under a close personal hand, and normally decisions were based upon his own personal experience and abilities rather than upon recommendations from the Department's specialists. This method of operation resulted in a degree of inefficiency within the Department and lack of co-ordination with other agencies, but on the whole he was successful in meeting his objectives.[1]

Ideologically he was strongly opposed to the concept of communism. In fact, some saw him as a man who considered communism a spiritual evil. Albrecht von Kessel, the West German Minister in Washington said:

> Dulles was an American Puritan very difficult for me, a Lutheran, to understand. This partly led to a conviction that Bolshevism was a product of the devil and that God would wear out the Bolsheviks in the long run, whereas many consider it a perversion of Russian qualities. His line was, "we stand firmly together and we are sure to win." Others believe much more in not relying on God but in inducing the Bolsheviks, by imaginative diplomacy, to accept our blend of peaceful coexistence. Dulles' approach made him, to a certain point, an immobilist.[2]

Values

A content analysis of five speeches delivered by Dulles and Eisenhower which were made before, during and after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution has been conducted.[3] The purpose of this study was to determine the stated values which these two men made concerning the Soviet satellite system.

The most recurring value category expressed concerning satellite states was "Political Freedom." This theme was emphatically stated by Eisenhower

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[1]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, pp. 104-105.

[2]Drummond and Coblenz, Duel at the Brink, pp. 15-16.

[3]Appendix A contains extent and explanation of analysis.

and Dulles. Nearly one fifth of all the weighted value laden statements by them were in this category. They placed emphasis on the right for self government, and freedom from suppression. The words "enslaved peoples" and "captive nations" were used repeatedly in showing their disdain for the satellite system which restricted the political freedom of the people.

"Anti-communism" was another value category significantly stressed. Whereas Eisenhower repeatedly condemned the Communist system in comparatively mild terms, Dulles, although less frequently stressing the subject, did so in most emphatic and condemning language.

In these public statements "Action propensity," a willingness to take action, was significantly expressed, especially by Eisenhower. However, the specific actions which he referred to were not bold, and would indicate a soft American policy toward Hungary. He mentioned actions which would foster mutual prosperity and he urged the United States to set a good example to be followed by other nations.

"Individual freedom" was the other significantly expressed value. Both men severely criticized the Soviet system for depriving the people behind the Iron Curtain of their basic freedoms, their individual rights, their opportunities for social betterment, freedom to worship as they pleased and justice on an individual basis. The remaining values listed in the table below were only expressed occasionally by the administration, and therefore are considered to have been of lesser concern to the two men when considering Eastern Europe.

The term "liberation" occurred several times. The meaning of this term can only be determined by its use in the context of the speeches. It was used cautiously, and generally, without more descriptive explanation to show

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how this liberation should be carried out. It was clearly a positive value for Dulles, although its exact meaning was not clearly expressed in the analyzed speeches.

The statistical results of this analysis follow. The number of value-laden references, weighted for strength of expression and specificity of expression are reported for each category of values. The percentages of the total score for Eisenhower, Dulles and the total are indicated in parenthesis. For example, Eisenhower emphasized Political Freedom 15 percent of the time throughout the speeches which were studied. And between the two men, this value was emphasized 19 percent of the time. Thus using this approach, this value is considered the most important by the decision makers concerning U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe.

TABLE

VALUE CATEGORY	SCORE EISENHOWER		DULLES		TOTAL	
Political Freedom	50	(15%)	47	(27%)	97	(19%)
Anti-Communism	39	(12%)	30	(17%)	69	(14%)
Action Propensity	57	(17%)	9	(5%)	68	(13%)
Individual Freedom	28	(9%)	26	(15%)	54	(11%)
Liberation	0		29	(16%)	29	(6%)
Internationalism	19	(6%)	10	(6%)	29	(6%)
Economic Freedom	25	(7%)	2	(1%)	27	(5%)
Use of Force	22	(7%)	4	(2%)	26	(5%)
Honesty	21	(6%)	4	(2%)	25	(5%)
Peace	17	(5%)	7	(4%)	24	(5%)
Nationalism	20	(6%)	0		20	(4%)
Lawfulness	13	(4%)	0		13	(3%)
Conflict Resolution	8	(3%)	0		8	(2%)
Self Determination	0		8	(5%)	8	(2%)

The oratory of Eisenhower and Dulles, in the analyzed speeches, stressed freedom for the people of Eastern Europe. Both men apparently believed strongly in the democratic rights of men everywhere to be able to live their private

lives free from governmental domination. They believed that communism as practiced in Eastern Europe, deprived citizens of these basic rights and that the United States was responsible for condemning the practice of communism which violated those rights. Their public statements were aimed not only at the people of the United States, but at the people of the world to convince as many as possible that no government should be able to deprive a man of his basic freedoms. They did not attack communism as an inefficient political system, but as a system which went beyond the scope of governmental limitations when dealing with men's basic freedoms. The analyzed speeches clearly demonstrated that communism, as an ideology, was contrary to many basic beliefs and values of Eisenhower and Dulles. However, while condemning the communistic suppression of men's freedoms, neither speaker indicated that this system of government must be overcome by force. Rather, their oratory stressed that a system so contrary to man's nature could not endure, as long as the people under its control yearned for freedom. Such a system would erode away from the continuous struggle by men to be free to choose the way of their private lives.

This statistical analysis serves as an aid in determining what values these men expressed and is useful when determining how these men would react to a given foreign policy situation. The theory is that if a particular value is expressed by an individual sufficiently, it indicates that he is either for, or against that value to a degree relative to the frequency, the strength of expression and the specificity of expression with which he states that value. This type of analysis is an attempt to place in more definitive and predictable form the study of political motivation. It is, of course, recognized that a man, especially one in high political office, does not necessarily honestly express

those values which he believes. However, considerable work is being done in this field, and in some instances correlations have been drawn between expressed values and foreign policy decisions.

Foreign Policies of the Eisenhower Administration

Shortly after taking office, Dulles set out to create a foreign policy image that was radically different from that of the preceding Administration. He did this through several spectacular pronouncements. Those pronouncements which applied to the Hungarian situation were to be commonly referred to as "liberation," the "new-look" and "brinksmanship." During the election campaign of 1952 and during the first few months in office he announced that the old policy of containment of communism was to be replaced by a policy of liberation, which included the risk of war. His new-look foreign policy was tied to the strategic military concept of massive nuclear retaliation. And the brinksmanship concept was one of forceful personal diplomacy which envisioned taking the country to the verge of war without actually getting into war itself. This meant that calculated risks would be taken. Morgenthau says that these pronouncements were made for the purpose of creating a new and forceful foreign policy image in order for Dulles to gain public opinion support for himself and for his foreign policies.[1]

The liberation theme was expressed by Eisenhower and Dulles at numerous times. In August 1952 Eisenhower said:

> We can never rest and we must so inform the Kremlin that until the slave nations of the world have, in the fullness of freedom, the right to choose their own path, that then and only then can we say that there is a possible way of living peacefully

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[1]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, pp. 91-95.

> and permanently with communism in the world. We must tell the Kremlin that never shall we desist in our aid to every man and woman of those shackled lands who seek refuge with us.[1]

In September 1952, Eisenhower said:

> The fifth step in this program is to aid by every peaceful means, the right to live in freedom. The containment of communism is largely physical and by itself an inadequate approach to our task. There is also a need to bring hope and every peaceful aid to the world's enslaved peoples.[2]

In December 1952, Dulles said:

> . . . freedom will again become the force that puts despotism to rout. Then a new era of liberation will be ushered in. During the recent political campaign there was discussion about the policy of liberation. Some were frightened by this idea, feeling it meant war. That fear illustrates the degree to which even free people have come to think in governmental and military terms. Our nation, from its beginning, has stood for liberation.[3]

During the 1952 election campaign Dulles said that the old policy of containment was "negative, futile, and immoral."[4]

If containment was inadequate and liberation was the new policy, then it is necessary to determine what the liberation policy meant. Drummond says that Dulles' liberation policy did not carry with it any intent for the United States to assist revolutionaries, nor was it aimed at inciting people to rise up forcefully against the Red Army.

> He (Dulles) proposed instead to exert intense, unrelenting political, economic, and moral pressure on the communist empire from outside its borders, and to activate the same barrage of pressures inside its confines.[5]

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[1]James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 208.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 209.

[4]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 95.

[5]Drummond and Coblenz, Duel at the Brink, p. 71.

On the other hand, Averell Harriman took an opposing stance on the subject:

> Also during the 1952 Campaign Dulles had proposed his 'liberation' policies for the countries of Eastern Europe. I debated this policy with him face to face on several occasions during that campaign. I pointed out the danger of encouraging the people in those countries to revolt when we had no feasible way to come to their assistance. I said that if this policy was announced it would lead to the death of many brave patriots.
>
> After the 1956 Hungarian uprising, suppressed by the Red Army, thirty to forty thousand Hungarian refugees were admitted to the United States. I was the Governor of New York and we helped settle about one-third of them in the State. I saw many of the young men and women who had taken part in the uprising. All of them told me they had believed we would come to their assistance.[1]

Eisenhower, in a statement made on August 24, 1955, indicated that the United States was willing to fight in support of the dominated people of the world.

> Eagerness to avoid war--if we think no deeper than this single desire--can produce outright or implicit agreement that the injustices and wrongs of the present shall be perpetuated in the future. Thereby we would outrage our own conscience. In the eyes of those who suffer injustice we would become partners with their oppressors. In the judgment of history we would have sold out the freedom of men for a pottage of a false peace--. The domination of captive countries cannot longer be justified by a claim that this is needed for purposes of security.[2]

It appears that what the Administration said, and what its leaders actually believed concerning the liberation policy were two different things. The statements by Eisenhower and Dulles led one to believe that liberation was a dynamic policy which required action, as contrasted with containment which was a passive policy and was thus not acceptable. However, their actions in time of crises revealed that this did not hold true.

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[1]Harriman, W. Averell, America and Russia in a Changing World (Garden City; Doubleday, 1971), p. 59.

[2]New York Times, Aug. 25, 1955, p. 10.

Morgenthau says:

> The Eisenhower Administration shied away from the risk of war at least as much as had its predecessors. And when the East German revolt of 1953 and the Polish revolt and Hungarian revolution of 1956 put the policy of liberation to the test of actual performance, it became obvious that liberation was indistinguishable from containment.[1]

The brinksmanship policy was one for which Dulles was later criticized. A Life magazine article on 16 January 1956 dramatized Dulles' firm action which had prevented war in Korea, Indo-China and Formosa by taking us to the brink. The article referred to Secretary Dulles' remarks in an interview that the United States would regard an attack on Quemoy and Matsu as an attack on Formosa; that if there was no truce in Korea, the United States would bomb across the Yalu River into Manchuria; and that if Chinese forces intervened openly in Indo-China, United States air power would destroy staging bases in South China. The article quoted Dulles as saying:

> Of course, we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war.[2]

Dulles held a press conference on 17 January in which the Life article was discussed. During the conference Dulles said:

> This policy of seeking to prevent war by preventing miscalculation by a potential aggressor is not a personal policy; it is not a partisan policy; it is a national policy. It is expressed in mutual security treaties which we now have with forty-two nations and which the United States Senate has overwhelmingly approved.[3]

The "New Look" military policy called for a greater reliance upon a strategic nuclear strike force and a reduction of the conventional fighting

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[1]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 105.

[2]Deane Heller and David Heller, John Foster Dulles, Soldier for Peace (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 229.

[3]Ibid., p. 231.

forces. The Eisenhower Administration operated under a reduced defense budget which forced a shift in priorities for defense spending. The Korean War, a conventional war, ended early during Eisenhower's first term. At that time the defense budget was providing a large land army equipped with conventional weapons. Following Korea, the army was reduced in size, the air force was expanded, and reliance was placed on a nuclear force which would deter aggression against the United States and carry the threat of massive destruction against a country which attempted a large scale attack against the United States or its allies.

This chart shows the shift in emphasis resulting from the new-look.

MANPOWER	DEC 1953	OCT 1954	JUN 1955
Army	1,500,000	1,400,000	1,000,000
Navy-Marine	1,000,000	920,000	870,000
Air Force	950,000	960,000	970,000

Budget in billions of dollars

	FISCAL YEAR 1954	FISCAL YEAR 1955
Army	12.9	8.8
Navy-Marine	11.2	9.7
Air Force	15.6	16.4

[1]

Eisenhower described the new military policy as follows:

> . . . we might define the New Look as first, a reallocation of resources among the five categories of forces, and second, the placing of greater emphasis than formerly on the deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons, better means of delivery, and effective air-defense units.
>
> Other active combat units, including those deployed overseas and forces to keep the sea lanes open, were to be modernized and maintained at a maximum mobility and effectiveness, but with decreases in numerical strength. Supporting reserves in the United States, while important, were given lower priority.[2]

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[1]Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 450.

[2]Ibid., pp. 450-451.

He further stated:

> My intention was firm: to launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon trustworthy evidence of a general attack against the West. So I repeated that first priority must be given to the task of meeting the atomic threat, the only kind of attack that could, without notice, endanger our very existence.[1]

It can be argued here that rather than actual liberation the Administration sought to encourage a more practical course for the satellites--national communism. The Administration did actively support Tito, so much so that consideration was given to the idea that NATO pledge military assistance to Tito in the event of Russian military intervention in Yugoslavia. Dulles met with Tito in 1955 at Brioni to discuss international affairs and came away from the meeting with confidence in Tito as a person and in his policy of independence from Moscow. Later the Eisenhower Administration invited Tito to visit Washington. However, the plan caused such an uproar by Tito opponents in the United States that Tito himself called the trip off.[2]

Drummond described Dulles' attitude toward Tito's brand of national communism as follows:

> In short, he saw Titoism as an important rollback conduit. He believed in the potential spread of Titoism elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and in its ability to weaken Moscow's grip. Dulles, despite his invective against 'atheist communism' considered it a matter of policy that the United States could co-exist with a purely 'national' Russian communist regime. By this he meant the abandonment of Soviet rule outside Russian borders. In high-level State Department discussions on this issue, he was prepared to envisage a 'national' Russian community government flanked on its western frontiers by a series of friendly, even communist, eastern European states. He thus later sought to exploit Titoism further during Premier Gomulka's short lived resistence to Russian dominance over Poland. In the case of Poland, he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain Adenauer's cooperation.[3]

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[1]Ibid., p. 453.

[2]Drummond and Coblenz, Duel at the Brink, pp. 150-151.

[3]Ibid., pp. 151-152.

On the other hand, Westerfield believes that the Eisenhower Administration; "welcomed and assisted Tito as the lesser of evils, but feared that forthright advocacy of national communism by the United States would compromise Western principles, and dash the hopes of anti-communists in eastern Europe without improving--perhaps even reducing--the likelihood that Moscow would risk allowing the satellite communist regimes to have some independence."[1]

Morgenthau has summed up the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy as follows:

> Although Dulles consistently strove to make it appear that his foreign policies were different from, and superior to, the foreign policies of his predecessors, it is an historical fact that he essentially continued those very policies. Refusal to recognize the status quo in Europe and elsewhere through containment, as well as foreign aid, were the cornerstones both of his and his predecessor's foreign policy.[2]

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[1]H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1963), p. 249.

[2]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 105.

CHAPTER III

EXTERNAL INPUTS

It would be useful at this point to discuss the external circumstances that were considered by the United States policy makers. Certain external factors favored United States action in Hungary, while others did not. First will be discussed the factors in support of United States action.

FAVORABLE INPUTS

There could be no doubt that the USSR had intervened in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. In international relations, such intervention is considered illegal. The duly constituted government of Imre Nagy had never requested Soviet assistance in what began as a domestic disturbance. Prior to the second intervention, Nagy requested that all Soviet troops be withdrawn from Hungary. Moreover, Nagy's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, made Soviet action even more offensive. Nagy's request to the secretary general of the United Nations to invoke the aid of the great powers to protect neutral Hungary, and to bring Hungary's case before the United Nations assembly could have justified active United States assistance, probably under the auspices of the United Nations.

Moreover, the effect of an independent Hungary would have caused favorable reaction in other satellite countries from a United States point of view. Once Hungary had gained her freedom from Soviet control it is possible to assume that Poland and Czechoslovakia might demand their own independence. In fact, nationalist sentiment would probably intensify even in such areas of the Soviet Union itself as Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.[1]

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[1]Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin (New York: Mainstream Publishers, 1957), p. 198.

Thus a great weakening of large areas of the Soviet camp could have been expected if Hungary would have freed herself from the Soviet Union. This would have been a strong consideration in the minds of United States policy makers when confronting the Hungarian situation. Any such change which could alter the balance of power in favor of the West was worthy of strong consideration in determining United States actions.

Furthermore, Hungary held a potentially significant military position for the United States. This significance would have existed if Hungary were a neutral country but would have been magnified if the country could be brought into the West's system of allies. In practical terms, the country's geographic location splits the satellite countries in half, with Czechoslovakia on the north and Romania on the southeast. Thus, such a split in the Soviet buffer zone would have considerably weakened the Soviet Union's defensive posture.

One argument, following Hungary, was that radio broadcasts to Hungary encouraged the Hungarian people to revolt. Radio Free Europe was the object of most of these accusations. Radio Free Europe was ostensibly founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens. It broadcasts to five satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain--Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. According to one study, "From the beginning it has had political goals--the most significant being the ambitious one of trying to contribute to the peaceful liberation of the satellites."[1] In 1953 its broadcasts focused on the repudiation of the Soviet Union's "New Course" concept which seemingly was to benefit the satellite peoples.

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[1]Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 206.

The policy advisors at RFE interpreted these post-Stalin actions of the Communist Governments as an attempt to increase economic production and a means of strengthening the party apparatus by increasing effective political control over the masses through new elections. In response, RFE began broadcasts aimed at exposing these Soviet motives to the people. Its broadcasts outlined the real reason for the economic concessions and the contemplated new elections and further described the relationship between these two actions. Broadcasts by RFE against the New Course were the largest scale operations undertaken by that organization in its attempt to achieve the eventual liberation of the satellites. This large scale propaganda attack ended with the reversal of the "New Course" in early 1955 and the return of more traditional Soviet controls symbolized in Hungary by the overthrow of Nagy.

But the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, and the ensuing de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union itself presented RFE with ammunition to mount its most ambitious campaign. Three general themes were now utilized: 1) adding fuel to the fire--by applying the logic of de-Stalinization to areas where the communists had never intended them to apply; 2) indicating that the monstrous Stalin was in fact a product of the Soviet system and that the only method of insuring that another Stalin will not come to power is to change that system; 3) pointing out that the West was not being deceived by the de-Stalinization program and that the basic aims of Soviet imperialism had not indeed been fundamentally altered.[1]

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[1]Ibid., pp. 230-231.

Thus, RFE encouraged the people behind the Iron Curtain not to accept de-Stalinization on face value. On the contrary, they were urged to use de-Stalinization as a means for achieving real political and economic freedom, and to use it as an argument to disprove the basic teachings of communism.

Some believe that this mass communication effort directed toward the Hungarian people obligated the United States to support the revolt once it occurred by concrete means. However, no real evidence can be found to substantiate this claim. According to one study, the broadcasts were designed to "accentuate dissatisfaction and keep alive hope among the captive people. As incentive to action, these broadcasts went no further than to discourage collaboration with the communist overlords. Such a line could at most produce only slow-downs and sabotage."[1]

Whatever their intent, these broadcasts were a form of indirect encouragement to the freedom fighters to take action against the authorities. Accordingly, dissatisfaction with the United States by some Hungarians after the fighting partially stemmed from such broadcasts. Those who had expected United States military support had made assumptions which were presumably stimulated by such propaganda broadcasts. If the United States were so strongly opposed to Soviet domination of the satellites, and recognized the Soviet Union as its primary military enemy, then it might be expected to assist a population which attempted to openly fight the communists with home made weapons. Obviously freedom fighters recognized that it was impossible for them to throw out the Red

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[1]Westerfield, Instruments of Foreign Policy, p. 249.

Army unassisted. But if their display of courage could initiate a United States involvement, then victory might be possible. Such may have been the logic of some fighters.

In support of this view, Michener has quoted a Hungarian refugee as saying, following the 1956 uprising:

> Of course Hungarians are bitter about the lack of interest you Americans showed in our struggle for freedom. For years now, as part of your battle with communism for the possession of men's minds, you have been giving us hope and assurance. You have been saying to us, 'You are not forgotten. America's ultimate aim is to help you win your freedom. To achieve this we will support you to the best of our ability.'
>
> America spent millions of dollars and every known psychological trick to bring this message to us behind the Iron Curtain. Your Voice of America broadcasts fifty hours a day of freedom programs. You used seventy frequencies and sometimes I would hear you from Tangiers or Munich or Salonika.
>
> Then you set up Radio Free Europe in 1950 and you got right down to the business of freedom. You had eleven separate stations which broadcast over one thousand hours of encouragement a week from Frankfurt, Munich, and Lisbon. RFE told us many times, 'Our purpose is to keep opposition to communism alive among the people of the slave states behind the Iron Curtain. We want to help such people gradually to make themselves strong enough to throw off the Soviet yoke.'
>
> How did you help us to grow strong? You constantly reassured us that we were not forgotten by the West. You said that the fact that so many Americans supported RFE proved that your nation was with us. We believed you.
>
> Next to make your message even more clear, you began to launch balloons to fly over our country bearing leaflets and aluminum medals. I got one with a Liberty Bell on it and the legend 'Hungarians for Freedom--All the Free World for Hungarians.'
>
> These balloons were very important to our psychological reactions. I remember thinking at the time, 'at last something tangible. Something other than words. If America

> could reach us with aluminum medals, why couldn't she reach us with parachute supplies if a revolution started. Obviously, America intends to help us."[1]

On the other hand, in another study Bursten quotes a refugee referred to only as Istvan. Istvan had been an instructor of history and sociology at a Hungarian University and was described as an extremely interesting and intelligent individual. When asked if he ever heard RFE broadcasts which encouraged the people to take up arms and which had made promises that help would reach them soon, he replied:

> I never heard such broadcasts. I am inclined to feel that any and all words of hope and encouragement toward the upholding of the ideals of freedom and the democratic way of life that were broadcast would have been interpreted as encouraging a revolt. Perhaps it does create a climate under which people could, through wishful thinking, hope for help from the United States and would be willing to risk much in the hope that the help they dreamed about would come.[2]

Following the revolution, the United States Government, revealing some concern in the matter, conducted an investigation of the RFE broadcasts to determine if any statements had been issued which would have encouraged the Hungarians to expect United States support. The investigation concluded that no official broadcasts had been made which included those statements.[3]

UNFAVORABLE EXTERNAL INPUTS

The situation which developed in Egypt, concurrently with the Hungarian revolt, contributed to the Soviet resolve to liquidate the revolution.

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[1]James A. Michener, The Bridge at Andau (New York: Random House, 1957), pp. 249-250.

[2]Martin A. Bursten, Escape from Fear (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1958), p. 92.

[3]John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959 (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 314.

Reacting to Nasser's nationalization, America's strong and close allies, Britain and France, resorted to military force to keep the Suez Canal from Egyptian control. The United States strongly opposed the use of force in Egypt, and as a result of United States pressure, Britain and France yielded to the demands of Egypt and withdrew their troops.

The United States condemned the western powers in Suez as vigorously as it did the action by the Soviet Union in Hungary. But the Soviets remained defiant under the storm of criticism. Nevertheless, events at Suez only strengthened the Soviets' political posture. Western powers had resorted to forceful intervention in the affairs of another state. Therefore, an equation could be drawn between Western imperialism and Soviet imperialism. The Soviets were not alone in their policy of forceful intervention when necessary.

For the United States, the importance of the Suez situation tended to overshadow developments in Hungary. The Administration was faced with a grave situation whereby its strong and close allies were forcing the United States to make an extremely difficult and possibly disastrous decision. Dulles was backed to the wall by the action of Britain and France. These two countries had made an extremely bold move, without consultation with the United States. And now Dulles was forcing them to back down on what had already been initiated. Unquestionably, this was the most serious crisis which the Eisenhower Administration was destined to face. Heller described the gravity of the situation as follows:

> The Middle East was at war--and the dangers were appalling. Like a parched forest, that historic region could easily become a parched inferno if the wind blew the wrong way. Centuries of race hatred between the Arabs and the Jews; bitter Arab

> nationalism directed against the West and fanned to fever heat by Egypt's Nasser; ominous Russian threats to send volunteers into Egypt; all threatened to explode the limited war into a conflict beyond the power of any man to stop.[1]

Under the circumstances, priority had to be given to Suez. Perhaps the Soviets viewed the situation from this very perspective. Specifically, they may have reasoned that it was an ideal time to move into Hungary with little chance of United States intervention and with minimum attention by the rest of the world due to the focus of public attention on the Middle East, where United States leadership of the Western World was being challenged in Egypt.

Also, the crisis over Suez had been building up since the summer of 1956 when Nasser took over the Canal. United States diplomatic machinery was geared to this area. It had held top priority for several months prior to the landing of allied troops there. Bold action by the United States in Hungary would have required a rapid shift in diplomatic action from one area of the world to another. Such a change in direction and in priorities would have been difficult and might have resulted in hasty and ill-prepared actions.

Just as an independent Hungary would have been favorable to the United States, the effect of such a development on the Soviet Union would have been most serious. Hungary was a source of scarce uranium for nuclear weapons. Moreover, because of its central position in the overall Eastern Europe bloc of countries, Hungary held a significant strategic position for the Soviet Union. The two great wars of the twentieth century had broken out in large measure over the control of Eastern Europe. Throughout modern history, statesmen and geographers have emphasized the region's strategic importance. Eastern Europe contains routes between western Europe and Russia, between western

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[1]Heller, John Foster Dulles, Soldier for Peace, p. 3.

Europe and the Near East and between the Baltic and the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Russia is vulnerable through Eastern Europe. Before attacking the USSR in World War II, Germany had established control over large portions of Eastern Europe. Russia's domination of the region gives a contiguous zone from 400 to 700 miles in depth which serves as a buffer in case of invasion from the west. Conversely, Russia is favorably disposed to strike westward through Eastern Europe. Thus, it is clear that although Hungary occupies only a small area, its loss by the Soviet Union would affect all of its strategic advantages because of Hungary's central position in Eastern Europe. Its loss would leave a vulnerable gap in Russia's western buffer zone.[1] Furthermore, an independent Hungary would have disasterous effects on the satellite system which Russia held dearly. Granting freedom to Hungary would have caused similar demands by other satellites, and resulted in a weakening of Soviet control over its important colonies.

A less definable argument which would emphasize the importance of Hungary to the Soviet Union is one which considers the overall world balance of power. According to one line of reasoning, a bipolar power structure evolved from World War II. The USSR headed one half of this structuring of nations, and the United States the other. This balance was so delicate that the loss of Hungary by the Soviet Union would have altered the situation to a degree unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Aczel describes this reasoning as follows:

> All this can be summed up in a few sentences. What the Hungarian revolution attempted in 1956, was not less--even though indirectly and unconsciously--than a change

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[1]George B. Huzar, Soviet Power and Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1955), p. 452.

> in the whole international balance of power. To be more exact: Hungary, the government of the 1956 revolution, the Hungarian press and the armed masses, formulated demands, the realization of which would have weakened the international power position of the Soviet Union to an incalculably serious degree.
>
> The Soviet Union could not have conceded those demands and the West--i.e., the United States--could not have taken the equally incalculable risk inherent in the support of the Hungarian demands. Thus--so the argument goes--the demands were unrealistic and the responsibilities for this lies, of course, not with the politically unschooled 'unknown insurgents' but with the leaders of the revolution, in the first place, Imre Nagy. What was so unrealistic about the demands? On this the authors do not always agree, but in most cases they refer to the demand for a multi-party system, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the declaration of Hungary's neutrality.[1]

This argument then blames the leaders of the Hungarian revolution for its failure. One would say that the revolution leaders were uncompromising and that if less radical demands had been made, as in the case of the Polish crisis of the same year, perhaps the Soviets would not have been forced to destroy the revolution, and with it the liberalized policies for which the revolution was fought. A protest with less demanding changes might have been successful in causing the Soviets to make concessions to the Hungarians. But with the international balance of power at stake, a balance which had proven useful to both sides, the Soviets could not afford to let such a situation slip away, a situation which was in their power to control.

Most importantly, Hungary was a test of Khrushchev's immediate survival. His de-Stalinization program was the beginning of a series of contradictions which ultimately resulted in his removal from power. By his policy of relaxation he created a unique dilemma for himself and the reactions in Hungary forced him to react in a manner which he believed would insure his position, at least for the immediate future.

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[1]Tames Aczel, Ten Years After (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 155.

Morgenthau has offered an analysis of this aspect of the situation. When Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956 he not only destroyed the legitimacy of Stalin's rule but also cast doubt upon the legitimacy of Marxism everywhere. If a tyrant such as Stalin could rule supreme for twenty years under the legitimacy of Marxism, how could one be sure that other successors of Marx and Lenin could be trusted not to resort to Stalinist methods? This question shook the foundation of Marxism which claims to be a body of scientific truths, and of every regime which offers it as its justification.[1]

Through this reasoning process, Hungary could challenge the right of Soviet domination over other nations and demand political independence. On the other hand Khrushchev could not allow Hungary to break away. If he lost Hungary, the effects would have been felt in every communist state and he would have lost the confidence of those who had been supporting him in the Soviet Union. Therefore, while attacking Stalinism in theory he contradicted himself by employing the tactics of Stalin and moved Soviet troops into Hungary to suppress the revolution by force. He thus saved his immediate position within the Soviet Union, while at the same time weakening it in the long run by contradicting his arguments against Stalin.[2] He created a situation whereby Soviet domination of all satellite countries could be challenged and he also weakened the Leninist-Stalinist theory that the Soviet Union held a monopoly on leadership of the world communist movement by revealing that such leadership could only be based on the force of arms. Khrushchev was able to act as he did in the Hungarian situation, but as a result his high position in the world communist organization was weakened. As time went on his contradiction in

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[1]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 116.

[2]Meray, Thirteen Days, p. 203.

Hungary and other related decisions allowed other communist governments to question the legitimacy of his authority since the concept of Soviet supremacy had been shattered by his own doings.

In the Hungarian crisis he saved himself from almost certain overthrow by resorting to force but in the long run he only contributed to his eventual forced retirement from public service. As one author argues, "Even if one were to assume that he retired from supreme power for reasons of ill health--an assumption obviously rendered untenable by the humiliating circumstances of his retirement--Khrushchev would go down in history as the liberalizer of communist totalitarianism and as the victim of that liberalization."[1]

Brzezinski illustrates another aspect of the importance of the Hungarian uprising to the Soviet Union:

> Hungary hence marked the defeat of true national communism. National communism could now be sought by various states only in relative doses, depending on the circumstances, the place, and the timing. And under such conditions, there could be no doubt that the overwhelming interests and political considerations of the Soviet state would be the determining factor. The Soviet regime, even in the most acute anti-Stalinist phase, had made it quite plain that it would insist on the leadership of its party in communist counsels, on the maintenance of the dichotomic image of the world with all its political consequences, on the necessity of militant 'proletarian internationalism.' No communist regime could be tolerated if it conflicted with international objectives, although sometimes such international objectives could dictate a measure of tolerance for local peculiarities otherwise distasteful. Only within this framework could concessions and adaptations be made, but they would fall quite short of anything resembling national communism.[2]

The action which the Soviet Union did take in Hungary clearly indicated the need felt to retain control over that country. With little hesitation, the

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[1]Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 116.

[2]Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc, p. 235.

Soviets used the ultimate tool of power in order to insure the unquestionable role of Soviet dominance of the satellites. The Soviet Union was apparently willing to risk a large scale, total war, rather than lose control of Hungary.

CHAPTER IV

Factors of the Domestic Situation

The domestic situation in the United States produced inputs for the decision makers to consider in determining their reaction to Hungary. Most of these factors were unfavorable to a dynamic policy and pointed toward a course of inaction.

When the Hungarian revolution broke out the presidential election campaign was in its final phase. Eisenhower's public image was that of the man who had insured peace for the nation, the man who had ended the Korean War. The American people had great confidence in his ability to keep the nation at peace. The situation as it stood on the eve of election all but insured re-election for Eisenhower. If he were to have taken vigorous action in Hungary, this could have shattered his image as the great peace maker in the minds of the voters. Thus, the President would not want to make any drastic decisions before election. It's possible that if the revolution had occurred after the election, Mr. Eisenhower might have taken a different view of the situation. But the timing of the revolution made the President cautious.

Significantly, the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson, only weakly criticized Eisenhower's position of inaction. Stevenson addressed a letter to the President, encouraging him to immediately set in motion the machinery to activate the Peace Observation Commission of the United Nations.[1] Stevenson criticized the Eisenhower administration for encouraging the uprising through the "liberation" policies of Secretary Dulles which had been announced in 1952. At the same time he blamed the Administration for the Suez crisis which he

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[1]New York Times, Nov. 2, 1956, p. 26.

charged had been caused by Eisenhower's dealings with Nasser in Egypt on the Aswan Dam incident, and the promises of foreign aid to Egypt, while limiting aid to Israel. Stevenson further criticized the Administration for not anticipating the crises, for being caught off guard, and not having a plan to deal with Hungary and Suez. But, in the eyes of one writer, the enormous crises which occurred in October 1956 only strengthened Eisenhower's chances for re-election.

> By mid-week he (Stevenson) had begun to realize that the majority of Americans were seeing what they had long been conditioned to see. Ike is a great military hero and a Man of Peace; he loves you; he knows best. Have faith in Ike. This had been the burden of Republican propaganda, echoed and amplified by an unprecedentedly adulatory press, for four long years. And in this time of trouble, it was to Ike that millions turned who might otherwise have voted for Stevenson.[1]

In addition to political considerations, the military establishment was not prepared to meet a situation such as Hungary presented. Because of the prevailing "massive retaliation" military concept, the army was not properly organized, nor equipped. United States Army combat forces in Europe were stationed primarily in Germany, with their major logistic facilities and organizations deployed in France. The five army divisions were part of the NATO force under the joint command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The mission of these forces was the defense of western Europe. War plans which had been prepared were geared to stop a limited Soviet attack into western Europe, and to slow down a full scale Soviet attack. During the slow down, or retrograde, reinforcements would be brought into Europe from the United States in preparation for a counterattack to the east. All of this planning was based on the limited use of nuclear weapons.

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[1]Kenneth S. Davis, The Politics of Honor (New York: Putnam, 1967), p. 346.

Accordingly, if United States forces had been used for operations in support of the revolution in Hungary, they would have created a gap in the defensive alignment of troops in the overall NATO war plan. Furthermore, cooperation would have had to be achieved with the other NATO countries for the release of those forces from their NATO mission, since the security of the other countries would have been weakened. In fact, Allied assistance might have been necessary to undertake the operation. However, NATO's European members were not likely to endorse such an employment of the Alliance for the benefit of the Hungarian fighters and were showing increasing resentment of the American role in the NATO councils.

One must also consider the military courses of action that were available. A limited attack into Hungary would have been extremely dangerous. A United States force equal in size to the Soviet force in Hungary would have stood less than a fifty percent chance of success. It could have met the Soviet force on equal terms, but would have faced the threat of rapid and massive Soviet reinforcement. Under such circumstances the United States force would have extended its lines of communication into the backyard of Soviet military strength and could easily have been cut off, isolated, and defeated in detail. On the other hand, a large scale attack would have increased the risk of all out nuclear war in Europe, and as a minimum could have reduced Hungary to rubble.

Finally, there was no direct access from western Europe to Hungary for United States forces. Troops would have had to travel either through Austria or Czechoslavakia. However, Austria was neutral and Czechoslavakia was a member of the Warsaw Pact. Either route added to the mounting disadvantages of an attack into Hungary. An airborne assault would have eliminated this problem

but only one airborne division was in Europe and airspace rights would have been necessary or they would have been violated. Logistical support of any of these operations would have been extremely difficult.

Discussing this situation, General James M. Gavin said:

> Next we should have sufficient force in being to enable the West, preferably as an instrument of the United Nations, to move into such a situation. The object of such an operation would be the restoration of law and order, and the supervision of the establishment of a government representative of the peoples' wishes--not one superimposed by Moscow with armored divisions of the Red Army. We were critically lacking the type of military force that would have been required to support action in Hungary. . .[1]

In addition to the lack of a military force in being to support the Hungarians, the United States did not have a peacetime plan for such an eventuality. United States policy makers had not anticipated what their course of action would be in Hungary, or in other East European countries, if Russia invaded the country with military forces. As a result, the United States did not have time to react to the fast moving situation with a well organized and efficient move.

In a subsequent study, General Gavin recommended a program which, had it existed at the time of the uprising, would have immediately supplied food and medical supplies to the country, along with transportation for evacuation for the wounded.[2] On a higher policy level, Lowenthal offered two possibilities to bring wider international considerations to bear on the decision of the Russian leaders, which could possibly have prevented their ultimate decision to crush the Hungarian revolution.

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[1]Gavin, War and Peace, p. 208.

[2]Ibid., p. 207.

> The first and most obvious was the effect on the uncommitted countries in Asia. That consideration, implicit in the whole strategy of competitive co-existence, had clearly exercised a restraining effect up to that moment. But as clearly, that effect was bound to reach its limits at some point--once the threat of the loss of the Soviet empire loomed larger than the threat of the loss of sympathies in Asia. The Soviet leaders would rather temporarily accept a set-back in the competition for uncommitted countries than put up with the total loss of their own possessions in half a continent. Moreover, the West was at the critical moment prevented from exploiting the restraining factor to the maximum owing to the Anglo-French action against Egypt which made it easy for non-committed Asian opinion to balance Soviet against "Western" inequities.[1]

Lowenthal's second consideration which the West could have brought into play would have been an offer by the United States to withdraw its military forces from Western Europe in exchange for a matching Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Lowenthal concludes that there can be no certainty that such an offer would have made a decisive difference to the Soviet leaders' choice. He believes however, that it was the only chance in influencing that choice, outside of a threat of world war.[2]

Another unfavorable domestic situation which might have contributed to the United States lack of action in support of the uprising was Mr. Dulles' sudden operation for cancer, while the revolution was in progress. President Eisenhower was without his righthand man at the time for a major foreign policy decision. It could be that President Eisenhower was reluctant to take a drastic initial step, while knowing that he might not have the services of his principal adviser, when the time came for following through on the entire operations. As it has been seen, the President relied heavily on his Secretary of State, and

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[1]Richard Lowenthal, "Hungary, Were We Helpless," The New Republic, November 26, 1956, p. 45.

[2]Ibid.

his serious illness could have caused the President to be uncertain as to the proper course to follow, and therefore afraid to make a decision for positive action.

It should be noted that considerable public opinion in the United States favored concrete United States action in Hungary. The campaign speeches for liberation, coupled with the beliefs about the radio broadcasts mentioned earlier had contributed to this sentiment. Anti-communism was high in the country, and communist expansionism or show of force in Eastern Europe was highly unpopular, and considered unjust by most American people. Many believed that a nonsupport policy in such a revolt would lead to the future loss of Democracy for all. General Gavin said:

> I do not believe that the Free World can endure many more 'Hungarys'--not and remain free. It cannot continue to stand by and watch a freedom-seeking nation be destroyed before its very eyes without doing something about it. A repetition of this will surely lead, ultimately, to the destruction of the West.[1]

In the view of a segment of American public opinion, Hungary was a "once in a lifetime" situation. It was believed that this would be the only chance to save Eastern Europe from Red domination. If the United States failed to help these people, then the people of all of the satellite countries would lose all hope for freedom, and would no longer openly attempt to resist Russian domination.

But were the American people prepared to support a large scale war with the Soviet Union over Hungary? The far-sighted view of the situation had to consider this question, because military action in Hungary could have very

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[1]Gavin, War and Peace, p. 207.

possibly resulted in a major confrontation with Russia. While expressing their support for the freedom fighters, it does not appear that the majority of the American public favored such a possibility.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the following questions need to be considered:

1. Did United States policy advocate active participation in the Hungarian crisis?
2. How important was Hungary to the two great powers?
3. How great were the risks, and were they worth taking?
4. What actions did the United States actually take?
5. What actions should the United States have taken?

Prior to the Hungarian revolution, United States policy as expressed by Secretary of State Dulles had appeared ambiguous. He had talked of the "liberation" of Eastern Europe from Soviet control but he had never said that this goal should be achieved by other than peaceful means. This was therefore essentially an idealistic goal that was not considered practical by Government officials if its achievement could only be met through violence.

A nationalistic form of communism was certainly more acceptable than outright Soviet domination and such a development might be viewed at least as a step in the desired direction. Nevertheless, it was communism, and at that time to the United States Administration as a principle of foreign policy communism in any form was unacceptable. In any event, it does not appear that the propaganda broadcasts were made to deliberately arouse the people to attempt an armed uprising in Hungary. Their purpose was essentially to create dissatisfaction with Soviet domination. This dissatisfaction would be expected to cause a lack of motivation by the people and thus hinder the economic and political progress of the satellite countries.

On the other hand, the Administration must have been aware that the broadcasts could have been misinterpreted by some of the people of Eastern Europe and could contribute to a more severe form of protest than the one intended. It might thus be assumed that had the initial mass protests in Hungary been successful, and the Soviet troops had not re-entered Hungary on 1 November, the Administration would have credited the RFE broadcasts with contributing to that success. But since a violent revolution resulted, which appeared doomed to failure, the Administration took pains to prove that the broadcasts were not the cause of the massacre of the freedom fighters, and that United States assistance had not been promised. Indeed, there is no evidence that a direct promise of United States assistance was ever made.

It may therefore be argued that although the Administration refused to admit it, containment of communism rather than liberation was the overriding United States foreign policy with respect to Eastern Europe. Despite the rhetoric, the United States tacitly recognized Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence. This sphere had been practically established and indirectly recognized by the United States before the conclusion of World War II, through agreements made among the principal Allied powers, which included the Soviet Union. This had been done for a combination of political and military reasons. Obviously, the military decision to invade the continent of Europe in Western France, rather than the Balkans, had vital consequences for the fate of Eastern Europe. Political agreements associated with this decision restrained the Allied advance along the west bank of the Elbe River in Germany and just beyond the border of Czechoslovakia. In fact, Allied armies which had already crossed the Elbe were called back. As one author

points out, "Although the forces of the Western Allies were in a position to occupy not only Berlin and Prague but also Austria, much of Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany, and some of Yugoslavia, they were restrained as a result of the previous agreements with Stalin."[1]

Following the war and despite repeated protests, the United States continued to recognize this Soviet sphere of influence and this attitude manifested itself in the basic containment policy. The United States demonstrated this policy in practice in its reaction to events in Hungary in 1956. This policy exists today and indicates that the United States is not willing to risk a general war in Europe unless the truce lines established at the termination of World War II have been violated. In summary, Westerfield said:

> . . . yet the failure to give full approval to a moderate and relatively realistic objective like 'national communism' tended to lead satellite populations, stirred by the talk of roll back and liberation, to expect concrete American assistance in their pursuit of a form of emancipation that could only be achieved by revolutionary violence, and not to wait indefinitely for evolutionary mellowing. And if assistance to violence might lead to war, the Eisenhower Administration was actually no more willing to attempt it than Truman's had been; the war would be too costly to those who were to be liberated as well as to the West. Containment remained the fundamental operative policy of the United States.[2]

Relatively speaking, Hungary was much more important to the Soviet Union than to the United States. It was of course, in conformity with American ideals and general principles that Hungary be free. This made a free Hungary important to the United States. Moreover, any loss of Soviet

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[1]Huzar, Soviet Power and Policy, p. 450.

[2]Westerfield, Instruments of Foreign Policy, p. 250.

control and power was important to the United States. However, Moscow considered the retention of Hungary within its orbit as a vital concern. The loss of Hungary would have caused far-reaching internal and external problems to the Soviet structure. On the other hand, the concrete benefits which the United States would have gained if Hungary were free and independent would have been quite small by comparison. Since Russia did consider Hungary so important, she appeared to be willing to risk a large scale war in Europe in order to retain its control of Hungary. This risk of war was far too great for the United States to gamble with, just to have Hungary free.

The "brinksmanship" concept did not apparently apply to Hungary. A calculated risk was not to be taken in this case. Or perhaps it was obvious to the Administration that because of the realities of the situation, any movement to the "brink" in Hungary was likely to result in the United States backing away in the face of Soviet determination and under the glare of public attention. Hungary was not a place to bluff the opposition. The bluff would have been called by the Soviet Union. After all, the United States had lived quite prosperously since 1945, with Hungary under Soviet control. It was therefore realistic to assume that life in the Western World would continue to prosper with a Soviet dominated Hungary. In summation, it could be said that the United States' desire to have Hungary break away from Soviet domination was almost an entirely idealistic one, and not a practical goal under the existing circumstances. Since Russia considered it absolutely necessary to retain Hungary, there appeared to be no alternative to acquiescing to that fact.

In view of these practical considerations, therefore, the United States limited its response to public denunciation of Russian actions, and to an attempt to curb hostilities through the United Nations, which proved to be a lesson in the limitations of that international organization. As could be expected, the Russian veto in the Security Council prevented any United Nations assistance to Hungary. The lesson learned is that the United Nations could only act effectively on problems when both of the two great powers were in concurrence. If either the United States, or Russia disagreed on a proposal before the United Nations, the only function that organization served was a means for voicing opinions, ideas, and differences.[1] As for the United States, it confined itself to promises of financial assistance to the Nagy Government and to assistance in the relocation of refugees.

In 1965 Eisenhower explained quite frankly the reasons for United States inaction as follows:

> The Hungarian uprising, from its beginning to its bloody suppression, was an occurrence that inspired in our nation, feelings of sympathy and admiration for the Hungarian people. No one shared these feelings more keenly than I; indeed, I still wonder what would have been my recommendation to the Congress and the American people had Hungary been accessible by sea or through the territory of Allies who might have agreed to react positively to the tragic fate of the Hungarian people. As it was, however, Britain and France could not possibly have moved with us into Hungary. An expedition combining West Germany or Italian forces with our own, and moving across the neutral Austria, Titoist Yugoslavia, or communist Czechoslovakia, was out of the question. The fact was that Hungary could not be reached by any United Nations or United States units without traversing such territory. Unless the major nations of Europe would, without delay, ally themselves spontaneously with us (an unimaginable prospect), we could do nothing. Sending United States troops

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[1]A.F.K. Organski, "The Question of Hungary," Current History, June, 1956, p. 78.

> alone into Hungary through hostile territory would have involved us in general war. And too, if the United Nations, overriding a certain Soviet veto, decided that all the military and other resources of member nations should be used to drive the Soviets from Hungary, we would inevitably have a major conflict. Though the General Assembly passed a resolution calling upon the Soviets to withdraw their troops, it was obvious that no mandate for military actions could or would be forthcoming. I realize that there was no use going further into this possibility.[1]

Although Eisenhower wrote of the possibilities of sending forces into Hungary in his autobiography, it appears that he was merely justifying his decision in 1956. He made no mention of United States policy but implied that the use of military force was a strong consideration and that force was not used primarily because of inadequate lines of communication from Western Europe to Hungary. Had the revolution occurred in Czechoslovakia, with direct access from West Germany, he implied the situation would have been quite different.[2] Nevertheless, this writer does not believe that Hungary's geographic location was the overriding consideration in the decision not to use the United States military force. The decision was based on the continued acceptance of the basic containment policy.

During the uprising, neither the opposing presidential candidate, nor other high office holders in the Departments of State and Defense, publicly stated that military assistance to Hungary was a feasible course of action. This author can offer little criticism of the stand taken by the United States on Hungary. The situation as it stood left the United States little room for action. The Soviets were employing military force, and the

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[1]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 88-89.

[2]Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 450-451.

only way the United States could counter that force was with like military force. This certainly would have been a great risk of all out war, and Hungary was not that important to the United States. Furthermore, the United States was not militarily equipped to counter the Russians in an "Hungarian War," nor were its European Allies prepared to seriously consider direct action in the Hungarian crisis.

Those who believed that the United States should have become militarily involved in Hungary were idealistic, and did not understand the situation. It would have been very unrealistic to believe that the United States Army could have immediately appeared in Hungary, defeated the Soviets, and saved the defenseless Hungarians. In short, the risks were too great and the prize was too small.

APPENDIX A

CONTENT ANALYSIS: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION, 1956

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to analyze five key speeches delivered by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles to determine their values concerning United States Foreign Policy toward the East European Satellite Countries. Attention is focused on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. When the United States failed to actively support the revolutionaries, many people of the free world were shocked at United States' inaction. Some believed that the United States had committed itself to liberate the satellite states when the situation presented itself. United States reaction to Hungary was significant since it set a precedent for future United States foreign policy regarding Eastern Europe.

One speech was delivered by Mr. Eisenhower while he was the Republican Presidential candidate in 1952. His only references to East European countries were "the far corners of the earth, and the world's enslaved peoples." Specific countries, and in particular Hungary, were never mentioned.

On October 23, 1956 President Eisenhower addressed the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the day after demonstrations began in Hungary. However, his only specific reference was to Poland which had just gained some degree of independence from Soviet domination.

On October 27, 1956 Mr. Dulles addressed the council on World Affairs in Dallas in which he specifically addressed the problem of "the captive nations," and referred to events in Poland and Hungary.

On October 31, 1956 President Eisenhower appeared on national television to address the Hungarian situation.

The final speech was delivered by President Eisenhower on April 27, 1957 to the Associated Press. In this speech he devoted some space to "the captive nations" with specific reference to Hungary.

Very few references were made to the Hungarian situation by Misters Eisenhower and Dulles. Not until the revolution occurred did they specifically address Hungary. Prior to that time they only referred to the captive nations and the imprisoned peoples when discussing the Soviet Satellites.

TABLE I

Coding Instructions

A. Definition of Value Unit and its Components

1. A value unit is an evaluative expression that is extracted from a given text and is composed of:
   a. An object of evaluation and/or
   b. a standard of evaluation or
   c. it may also include a beneficiary.
2. The object is the component which the speaker considers desirable or undesirable, good or bad, right or wrong, etc. It may be an action, a person, a group, a nation, a proposal, an idea, a principle, a policy, a goal, a symbol, etc.
3. The standard is the component by means of which the speaker forms his judgement of the object, i.e., the standard tells why the object is good or bad, etc.
4. The beneficiary is that person or group of persons in whose behalf the evaluative judgement is made.

B. The following notations will be made. Underline the object. Circle the standard.

C. When the speaker makes reference to a standard by using several words that ordinarily connote two or more standards, then his reference is to be considered a single standard.

D. A set of 14 categories of standards is found at Table II.

E. Definition of scales. Each categorized standard is to be scaled along two dimensions.

a. Strength identification

b. Specificity

1. The strength with which a standard is expressed as being held or rejected; the degree to which the speaker identifies himself or disassociates himself with the standard; or the extent to which the speaker expresses a commitment or opporition to a standard, is expressed on a four point scale.

+ 2 strong identification with standard

+ 1 weak identification with standard

- 1 weak rejection of standard

- 2 strong rejection of standard

2. The specificity of the expressed standard or how differentiated the standard appears in the context of the speech is measured on a four point scale.

1. Least specific reference to a standard.

2. Somewhat qualified reference to a standard.

3. Somewhat specific reference to a standard.

4. Most specific reference to standard.

F There are two recording sheets.

1. Recording sheet for recording categories and scaling of standards. It lists the basic category set. Each time a standard is placed in a value category the strength and specificity will be noted in accordance with paragraph E above.

2. Recording sheet for transcribing value units. After categorizing and scaling of the standard of each value unit the object and/or standard and/or beneficiary is to be extracted and recorded in the appropriate columns of this sheet. Each object will be scaled for strength of expression and specificity in accordance with paragraph E above.

TABLE II

Categories of Values Determined

1. Political Freedom, including
   a. rights of citizens
   b. fruits of citizenship
   c. limited government
   d. democracy
   e. freedom from suppression
2. Individual Freedom, including
   a. individual rights
   b. social and educational opportunity
   c. justice for individuals
   d. religious freedom
3. Honesty - truthfulness in presenting facts
4. Nationalism - orientation favoring international goals
7. Use of force (coercion)
   a. overt military action
   b. police tactics
   c. military occupation
8. Anti-communism - opposition to the doctrine and practices of communist bloc countries
9. Liberation - freeing a country from outside political control
10. Action Propensity - willingness to take definite action rather than stand back and observe

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9. Liberation - freeing a country from outside political control
10. Action Propensity - willingness to take definite action rather than stand back and observe

11. Conflict Resolution - commitment to harmony and agreement
12. Economic Freedom, including
    a. freedom to organize labor
    b. freedom to bargain
    c. freedom to strike
13. Lawfulness - respect for and acceptance of actions because they conform to law and international rules of conduct
14. Self Determination - the right of the people to determine their own form of government. Not included under political freedom because it was a specific issue in Hungary and was addressed in specific terms by the Eisenhower Administration.

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